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Europe monitors transits using radiation detectors to prevent illicit trafficking
of nuclear materials. The SCINTILLA project aims to develop a toolbox of
innovative technologies designed to address different usage cases. This article
will review the scope, approach, results of the first benchmark campaign and
future plans of the SCINTILLA project.
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1. The homeland security surveillance
The advantages of worldwide interconnectivity, with free movement of peo-
ple and goods, is countered by the need to constantly monitor these move-
ments in order to identify and prevent illegal trafficking of sensitive nuclear
materials. There exists a broad variety of sensitive targets to survey, not
only at international borders but also in hospitals, where radioactive iso-
topes are used; vehicle checkpoints within a city or nation; and places where
large numbers of people gather, such as airports and public events. Both
surveillance and prompt intervention systems are needed to ensure civil se-
curity is maintained.
The detection of Strategic Nuclear Material (SNM) relies on the type of
emitted radiation. In most the cases the tools used are Radiation Portal
Monitors (RPM) made of a combination of 2 detectors, one for neutron de-
tection and one used for gamma detection and identification. Considering
the case of plutonium and other fissile elements, the characteristic signature
derives from the neutron emission, opposite to a large variety of common
materials, which are gamma emitters. Examples are the substances known
as Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM), which are common
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in such goods as fruits or construction materials (bananas, coffee, concrete,
fertilizers, etc.) and they have to be discriminated from other materials
like medicals (67Ga, 131I, etc.) or other gamma sources (241Am, 60Co, etc.).
These radiation sources cover a broad energy range from a few tens of eV
up to few MeV, making gamma and neutron detection very challenging. In
the case of neutron detection, devices used for nuclear security are mostly
based on 3He technology. In the last few years the market trend of 3He
encountered huge problems in matching supply and demand [1] causing an
exponential increase in the price. For this reason, it become important to
develop an alternative detection systems based on new technologies [2].
2. The SCINTILLA project
It is almost impossible to cover the many variety of possible situations,
described in Sec. 2, with a single detector.
The SCINTILLA project [3], within the European Community’s Seventh
Framework Program (FP7), is proposing an innovative and alternative way
of addressing radiation detection in the nuclear security field, providing
a toolbox of devices developed for specific usage cases. SCINTILLA in-
volves a consortium of 9 partners, including 5 research groups (CEA, EK,
Fraunhofer INT institute, INFN and Joint Research Center (JRC)) and 4
companies (ANN, Arttic, Saphymo and Symetrica), providing 9 detector
prototypes listed in Tab. 1. These devices are based on 6 different technolo-
gies (4 scintillator–based and 2 semiconductor technologies) and cover 6
different usage cases that were defined within the scope of the project. For
Table 1. Parameters of the technologies under development.
Detector Sensitivity Usage case Developer
Gd–lined plastic scintillator n+ γ container, vehicle INFN/ANN
LiZnS detector n
container, vehicle,
luggage, people
Symetrica
NaI(Tl) spectrometer γ spectroscopy luggage, people Symetrica
2 PVT spectrometers γ spectroscopy
container, vehicle,
luggage, people
Symetrica
2 PSD Plastic scintillatorsa n+ γ
container, vehicle,
luggage, people
CEA and Saphymo
CZT gamma camera γ portable device CEA
Mini–CZT γ miniature device CEA
this reason, the SCINTILLA project is also providing a set of test–bed ser-
vices and technology benchmarks to perform testing of detectors according
aPSD: pulse shape discrimination
August 20, 2018 14:12 WSPC - Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in ws-procs9x6
3
to international standards and determine performance and improvements
in technology along the full duration of the project.
3. The first technology benchmark
One of the most important aspect of the entire program is the evaluation of
the state of development of the technologies, with the possibility to carry
out dedicated radiological performance tests of single detectors or multiple
devices in parallel. The program foresees annual benchmarks for all part-
ner’s prototypes in one of the 3 partner facilities: JRC, in Italy, is specialized
in radiometric dynamic tests of multiple devices according to international
standard requirements; the hungarian EK facility is used for measurements
with radioactive sources and the Fraunhofer INT facility, in Germany, is in
charge of final assessments of integrated systems.
The first benchmark was held in February 2013 at the JRC ITRAP+10 fa-
cility where all 7 RPM technologies were tested. The remaining 2 detectors,
the CZT gamma camera and the mini–CZT device, will be tested during
the second benchmark in 2014. The laboratory is equipped with a movable
cart, carrying the radioactive source, which passes in front of the detec-
tors under test, at a programmable speed. The testing conditions and in
particular the source speed, detector–to–source distance, and source type
were selected according to the usage cases the detectors are developed for,
following international standards (IEC and ANSI) [4–7]
3.1. Benchmark results
The first SCINTILLA benchmark was an important milestone for the
project.
Tested technologies can be divided into two groups: neutron detectors and
gamma spectroscopy detectors. The 4 neutron devices, 3 based on plas-
tic scintillators and one based on Lithium technology, detected all neutron
source transits. For the 3 scintillator based detectors, the intrinsic capabil-
ity to detect photons gave the possibility to test them also with gamma
sources. Also in this case, their behaviour was very promising, especially
for the detection of gamma of medium and high energies.
The second group of 3 gamma spectroscopy technologies were exposed
to the same radioisotopes: one detector was tested for gamma identifica-
tion while the other 2, small plastic scintillators, for gamma categorization
(NORM or NOT NORM ), both showing positive results.
One of the RPM tested devices is the neutron detector developed in collab-
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oration by INFN and ANN. It is based on a combination of plastic scintilla-
tor and Gadolinium, a material with high cross section for neutron capture
(σnc = 259kb for thermal neutrons). The good combination and compro-
mises between innovative design, robust and commercial components, leads
to a alternative and versatile detector. Including the intrinsic capability of
gamma detection refined with a custom made event selection algorithm,
transforms a neutron detector into a device with gamma discrimination in
terms of energy ranges. Plots in Fig. 1 show the measured rates as a func-
Fig. 1. Zoom of two dynamic measurements taken from the INFN/ANN detector. The
plot on the left shows 10 neutron source transits (252Cf) in front of the detector which
correspond to the peaks. On the left, 7 passages of the 137Cs source are shown. Each
coloured line represent a different energy range for energy discrimination.
tion of time, for two dynamic measurements performed during benchmark.
The straight lines represent the alarm thresholds set and the peaks, which
correspond to the increase of the detection rate, are due to source passages
in front of the detector. The right plot of Fig. 1 shows a 137Cs measurement
and the left plot of a neutron measurement obtained with a 252Cf source. In
the right plot, each coloured line corresponds to the gamma rate measured
in a specific energy range, but only three of the 4 lines show peaks revealing
all source transits. The magenta line, corresponding to the highest energy
range well above the 661.7 keV photon energy of the 137Cs decay, is flat
and gives an indication of the maximum energy emission of the source un-
der test. All performed tests revealed very positive results but also gave
indications for further improvements that will enhance the detection per-
formances. These modifications are being implemented in new versions of
detector prototypes that will be ready for the second benchmark campaign
of the early 2014. In summary, very positive and encouraging results were
obtained confirming the high quality of the underlining technologies and of
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the instrument implementation.
4. The RPM integration and the SCINTILLA network
One of the objectives of the SCINTILLA program is providing full RPM
systems for different usage cases. Currently deployed RPMs are generally
equipped with two types of radiation sensors, gamma and neutron detectors,
combined with other devices, as annunciators and occupy sensors, managed
by an intelligent system. This procedure is called integration. Even though
all SCINTILLA detectors are developed independently, a common commu-
nication protocol was implemented and tested. This first integration test
was held this summer, while the full systems will be tested during the next
benchmark campaign. Next benchmarks are also open to partners of the
Scintilla Partnership Network (www.scintilla-project.eu) which repre-
sents not only SCINTILLA partners but also outsiders (users, experts and
companies) involved in the nuclear security field. The idea is to have a
project with an impact in real life, not only to communicate the SCIN-
TILLA project progresses, but also proposing new or different evaluation
procedures to the ground for developments of novel technologies beyond
the present state of art.
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